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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AD NOTES
Fred E. Inbcmu
Legality of Taking a Sample of Blood for Alcoholic Intoxication Tests
.In the recent case of State v. Weltha,
292 N. W. 148 (Iowa, 1940), the Supreme
Court of IQwa reridered an important de-
cision regarding the legality of taking a
sample of blood for alcoholic intoxication
tests. The question before this appellate
court was whether or not the trial court
had been correct in admitting in evidence
the testimony of a chemist regarding the
results of alcoholic intoxication tests made
on a sample of blood which had been
taken from the defendant shortly after an
automobile collision that had resulted in
the death of another motorist. At the time
of the taking of the sample of blood from
the defendant, he was in an unconscious
condition with a broken jaw, broken leg,
and cuts and bruises generally. When the
sample was thus taken the defendant was
not under arrest, and up until then no
charges had been placed against him. The
physician who obtained the blood sample
was a coroner from another county of the
state than the one in which the accident
occurred or in which the hospital was
located.
In reversing the trial court's ruling in
admitting the evidence, the appellate court
stated: "We have here a situation where
a volunteer, without legal warrant and
without express or implied assent, in-
trudes himself into an operating room and
tzkes from an unconscious patient a blood
sample to be used to make or sustain pos-
sible future criminal prosecution. We can-
not bring ourselves to approve such a
course; and we find no authority which
requires us to do so."
The court also found objectionable the
careless method in which the evidence
was.handled up to the time it reached the
expert.
Should the Results of Alcoholic Intoxication Tests Be Accepted
as Conclusive Legal Proof of the Fact of Intoxication?
How much weight should be given to
the testimony of an expert regarding the
results of alcoholic intoxication tests? For
instance, should his opinion receive
greater weight than lay witness testimony
to the contrary? The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin was recently called upon to
answer such a question in the case of
Kuroske v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 291 N. W.
384 (Wis., 1940). In this case the de-
fendant insurance company was being
sued for recovery on an accident insur-
ance policy issued to the plaintiffs son
who had been killed in an automobile-
train collision. The insurance company
denied liability on the grounds that at the
time of the accident the insured was in-
toxicated to such an extent as to "impair
his ability to care for himself and thereby
increased the probability of his suffering
accidental injury"-and, consequently, ac-
cording to a clause in the policy, his bene-
ficiary was precluded from recovery.
Shortly after the accident, while the
insured and his brother (another occu-
pant of the car) were in a hospital, sam-
ples of blood were taken from each one
for the purpose of making tests for alco-
holic intoxication. The results, according
to the testimony of a chemist who ap-
peared as witness for the insurance com-
pany, indicated that the insured's blood
contained .25 per cent of ethyl alcohol by
weight. This figure was interpreted by
two additional experts as definitely in-
dicative of a state of alcoholic intoxica-
tion. The evidence introduced by the
plaintiff consisted largely of lay witness
testimony regarding the relatively small
amount of beer consumed by the insured
prior to the accident and also of testi-
mony as to his prior condition and ap-
.pearance. The jury found in favor of the
plaintiff and permitted recovery on the
insurance policy. The defendant insurance
company appealed and alleged that the
verdict of the jury was contrary to the
law and evidence in the case. The de-
fendant contended that the alcoholic in-
toxication test results and the expert
testimony concerning such tests "consti-
tuted physical or scientific- facts which
[365]
should be given the same controlling effect
that has often been accorded to undis-
puted physical facts by this court." The
appellate court, however, affirmed the
trial court's decision, stating: "The sample
of blood taken from the deceased was, of
course, a physical fact. Its alcoholic con-
tent, if accurately shown, was a physical
fact. The opinions of [the doctors], how-
ever, were obviously expert testimony, and
its weight, as such, was clearly for the
jury. It is generally recognized that the
relative weight and sufficiency of expert
and opinion testimony is peculiarly within
the province of the jury to decide and that
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the same tests commonly applied in the
evaluation of ordinary evidence are to be
used in judging the weight and sufficiency
of expert testimony.*** We therefore
conclude that the evidence adduced by
the plaintiff was sufficient to raise a jury
question; that the opinions of the experts
were properly received in evidence; that
the weight of the testimony of the lay
witnesses hearing upon the question of
intoxication of the deceased . . .was for
the jury; that the opinions of the experts
were not conclusive and the weight to be
given them was for the jury."
The Care and Preservation of Scientific Evidence
In both of the foregoing cases (State v.
Weltha and Kuroske v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co.) the samples of blood were very care-
lessly handled prior to the time when the
chemical tests were made. This fact most
certainly had its influence upon the court
in the Kuroske case, and perhaps in the
Weltha case as well. The careless methods
used in both instances are worth noting
as horrible examples of how not to care
for and preserve scientific evidence. In
the Kuroske case the doctor who took the
samples from both the insured and his
brother placed an identification "mem-
orandum" on each test tube containing
the blood specimens. The test tubes were
then taken by the doctor to his office
where he turned them over to his secre-
tary with instructions to deliver them to
the traffic officer who had requested the
doctor to take the samples. The secretary
placed the unsealed test tubes on a test
tube rack where they remained for sev-
eral hours until the officer called for them.
The officer kept the test tubes in the
pocket of his automobile "for two days."
Then the samples were turned over 'to a
railroad agent who wrapped them in a
package and sent them "by company mail"
to the general claim agent in another city.
The stenographer in the general claim
agent's office upon receipt of the package
unwrapped it and delivered the test tubes
to the chemist who was selected to make
the tests. It is perfectly apparent, there-
fore, what the appellate court had in mind
when it stated that "The sample of blood
. . . passed through so many hands that
the jury may not unreasonablk hiave en-
tertained some doubt whetlerits integrity
as a sample had been preserved." Indeed,
the court might well have held that in
view of the careless handling of the sam-
ple of blood no evidence should have been
admitted as to the results of any alcoholic
intoxication tests made thereon.
In the Weltha case the physician who
obtained the blood sample placed it in a
test tube which he carried around "in his
pocket ... for about two hours." He then
gave it to a nurse who in turn gave it to a
secretary who mailed it to the State Uni-
versity for analysis, without addressing the
package to any particular person. Because
of its not having been addressed to some
specific individual, the package was not
promptly delivered to the chemist for
whom its delivery was intended. Conse-
quently, it was not until three days after
the date of mailing that the package
reached the expert who made the test and
who appeared in court as a witness to
testify as to the results of his analysis.
Needless to say, scientific evidence, and
particularly of this type, should be trans-
mitted to laboratory technicians as soon
as it is possible to do so. Moreover, con-
siderable discretion should be exercised
in effecting the transmittal of such evi-
dence.
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Cross-Examination of Handwriting Expert by Experimentation
In the recent case of State v. Maxwell,
151 Kan. 951, 102 Pac. (2d) 109 (1940),
involving a forgery prosecution, defense
counsel attempted to cross-examine a
handwriting expert who testified for the
state by presenting him with an experi-
mental test and requesting him to render
an opinion thereon. The state objected to
this proposal on the ground that it did
not constitute proper cross-examination
and that if admitted it would give rise to
a determination of purely "collater-l is-
sues" and would "extend the trial in-
terminably on collateral issues and tend
to confuse rather than clarify the par-
ticular issues involved in the instant
charges." The trial court sustained the
state's objection, and upon appeal the trial
court's ruling was affirmed. In other
words, the court held that it was not
proper to cross-examine the expert by the
use of experimental tests.
Self-incrimination: Can an Accused Person be Compelled to Permit His Face to be
Shaved and His Hair Cut?
In a recent New York case, People v.
Strauss, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 155 (Kings County
Court, 1940), the prosecuting attorney
sought a court order which would require
the defendant to submit to a face shaving
and a hair cut, for purposes of his appear-
ance in court. While in jail awaiting trial
the defendant let his hair go untrimmed
and his face unshaven, until his scalp hair
became quite long and his face substan-
tially hidden by a heavy beard. At the
same time he behaved in such a~manner as
to cause a medical examination to be made
as to his sanity. In support of the motion
for the court order the prosecutor con-
tended that the defendant's purpose in dis-
guising his face was (1) to assume a wild
appearance of manic psychosis, and (2) to
make identification difficult if not impos-
sible. In answer to this the defendant con-
tended that his constitutional rights would
be invaded by the proposed order and that
the order would exceed any legitimate
court function. In ruling against the de-
fendant's contention and in granting, the
motion, the court said: "The constitu-
tional safeguard against compelling a de-
fendant in a criminal proceeding to be a
witness against himself does not apply.
That refers to testimonial compulsion, as a
'witness,' at a court hearing or trial, and
the word 'witness' is the keyword ...
The trial court may direct where the de-
fendant shall sit, in what direction he shall
face, and to stand up for the purpose of
identification. Also, it may strip him of
any artificial covering or disguise, and may
compel him to submit to compulsory dis-
robing for the purpose of revealing bodily
marks or characteristics whicli may aid in
identification. It may hardly be gainsaid
that a defendant .may be compelled to
appear cleanly washed, suitably dressed
and with hair properly combed' and
brushed. The defendant's argument that
this being a natural, rather than an arti-
ficially applied, disguise, provides a con-
trolling basis for distinction, is not well
taken. In all moot matters the stretching
of basic assumptions may admit of suffi-
cient in logic to support either side of the
question. Therein lies the peril to sensible
-decision. That peril should be avoided
here. Sound public policy seems to be the
determining factor in a holding, which is
now made, that any and all manner of
disguise, whether naturally or artificially
applied, are intolerable where-with all
legitimate individual rights duly respected
-a public right may be invaded by the use
of a disguise with the. reasonable likeli-
hood of impeding thereby the enforcement
of criminal law."
